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COMMUNIST PENETRATION IN AFRICA

Note by the Chairman of the Expert Working Group

The attached report on Communist Penetration in Africa was prepared by national experts, who met from 3rd to 5th April, 1963. It consists of Part I, setting out Conclusions and Policy Implications; Part II, which reviews general developments in the area; Part III, Communist Penetration; and five Annexes.

2. Belgian, Canadian, French, German, Greek, Italian, Netherlands, Portuguese, Turkish, United Kingdom and United States experts participated in the work of the Group.

(Signed) J. JAENICKE

OTAN/NATO,
Paris, XVIIe.

NATO SECRET

PART ICONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONSA. THE WEST VERSUS THE EAST IN AFRICA

The threat of Communist penetration in Africa persists and will continue in the foreseeable future. Our current assessment ranges from the restrained conclusion that there has been no worsening of the situation as far as the West is concerned, to the majority's more optimistic view that the evolution of the political situation in Africa and in the world during the last six months has contributed to a reinforcement of Western positions in Africa and has raised new difficulties for Soviet penetration.

2. Within Africa, the end of the Katanga secession may be considered as a step towards the stabilisation and economic viability of the Congo despite all that remains to be done including the assurance of law and order and the adoption of a constitution.

3. The Casablanca Group has failed to develop into an effective force and, in fact, shows signs of disintegration, while the influence of the moderate groupings increases and Guinea and Mali draw closer to their neighbours.

4. Turning to the debit side of the internal situation, we must take note of certain endemic conditions in the new African states which may be exploited by the Communists. Among these are African impatience for the millenium following independence, dissatisfaction with administrative inefficiency and corruption, the gap between living standards of the new élite and those whose material life has not been improved by political change, regional and tribal disputes and the pressure of a new generation eager to replace present African leaders.

5. There is also the threat of spreading inter-racial violence now openly advocated by the pan-African Freedom Movement for East, Central and South Africa (PAFMECSA) and bloc representatives at the Afro-Asian people's Solidarity Conference (AAPSO) in Tanganyika in February. The frustration of the political ambitions of Africans in Southern Africa, particularly in South Africa, offers opportunities for Communist penetration and is a major embarrassment in relations between the West and the independent African states.

6. African leaders and their representatives in the United Nations and elsewhere have been impressed by the West's confrontation of the Soviet move in Cuba, the Sino-Indian conflict, the Soviet-Chinese ideological quarrel and the treatment of African students in Bulgaria.

B. POLICY IMPLICATIONSWestern Assistance to and Consultation on Africa

7. The position of the West in Africa will be determined by developments throughout the continent, including for example the extent to which the newly independent states are able to create viable political systems and to satisfy at least the minimal demands of their populations. Economic and technical assistance by NATO members to the new states thus strengthens the position of the West in general.

8. The position of the West in Africa will also be decided in important measure by the nature of the West's response to the problems arising in the white-controlled territories of Southern Africa. This challenge points out the need for continuing exchanges of views and consultation among NATO member countries as appropriate on trends throughout the area. Some experts feel that, if hope for ultimate self-government were held out to the native populations, it might be easier to direct African aspirations into constructive channels.

Countering Soviet Bloc Civil Aviation Activity

9. We urge that this activity, outlined in more detail in Part III of this report, be kept under review by NATO members. In some cases, Bloc action could be headed off by expanding Western services, in others, further consideration might be given to assisting the local and regional expansion of indigenous African airlines. There is room for limited action in the area of education and admonition of African states concerning the dangers of Bloc activities. Unless great care is taken, however, this approach could easily be considered by the African states as an affront rather than a friendly warning. The exchange of information between Western countries should be continued and made as effective as possible.

Departure of African Students from Bulgaria

10. The co-operation between NATO partners in accepting African students from communist countries which had already been suggested in the last Experts' Report, has proved its worth in this case also and should be continued. But efforts should be made to avoid the appearance of concerted NATO action in this field which would be resented by Africans as an attempt to make the plight of these students a cold war issue. The enlightenment about Communism from African sources, such as returning students, should be encouraged by suitable means.

Education in Africa

11. In the long run, the creation in Africa of new universities and other educational establishments would doubtless solve, at least in part, the problem raised by the departure of African students from Communist countries.

The First International Congress of Africanists

12. The First International Congress of Africanists, which was held in Accra in December 1962, highlighted the new interest taken in African studies in Eastern Europe (Czechoslovakia, Poland). Owing to the importance both scientific and political (USSR) attaching to the proceedings of the Congress, the Western powers should endeavour to co-ordinate their action in the interval between plenary sessions of the Congress.

PART IITHE AFRICAN SITUATIONAfrican Groupings

13. The most important recent developments have been: the failure of attempts to reactivate the Casablanca Group; the strengthening of the moderate UAM and Monrovia Groups; the adoption by PAFMECSA of an activist rôle; and the decision to hold a Heads of State Meeting in Addis Ababa in May.⁽¹⁾

14. The decline of the importance of the Casablanca Group has been caused, in general, by personal rivalries between Heads of State, the widening gap between North and Black Africa and differences of economic structure. More particular causes are the set-back to Egyptian efforts; the defection of Ghana; the rapprochement of Guinea and Mali with the Etats de l'Entente, Senegal and Mauretania; and the new orientation of Moroccan policy.

15. The Union Africaine et Malgache (UAM), which Ruanda has just joined, remains the most cohesive and effective African grouping. But the more broadly based Inter-African and Malagasy States Organization (IAMSO) - the Monrovia Group - somewhat strengthened its position with the initialling last December of the Lagos Charter by seventeen members. IAMSO has, however, failed so far to organize a permanent secretariat, and has felt the divisive effects both of the divergent outlooks and backgrounds of English and French-speaking Africans and of the division between states associated and not associated with the European Economic Community.

16. About thirty African Heads of State are due to attend a "Summit Conference" which is to open in Addis Ababa on 23rd May, 1963. This meeting could have an important impact on the future of existing African groupings. Meanwhile, rivalries between the various groups are restrained by their unwillingness to seek tactical advantage at the expense of African "unity". Most African countries set high hopes on laying the foundations at Addis Ababa for greater inter-African co-operation.

(1) For membership of the African Groupings see Annex I.

17. PAFMECSA has recently developed a stronger sense of regional solidarity and it assumed an active rôle at the Leopoldville meeting last December in the movement to "liberate" East, Central and Southern Africa. At the same time, Dar-es-Salaam has acquired increased importance as a centre of pan-African activities, though Tanganyika has held herself aloof from both the Monrovia and the Casablanca groups.

18. African solidarity need not necessarily work against Western interests; and it is likely in any case to go through considerable further development before it achieves an effective organizational structure and political force.

African Trade Unions

19. The Trade Unions are, to some degree, called upon to play a political rôle since they often constitute the best organized pressure groups in the African States. Since independence, Trade Union tasks proper are, however, gradually coming to the fore once again.

20. The Unions' main aims are, apart from the achievement of African unity: rapid industrialisation; a planned economy; the phasing-out of the traditional social structures.

Africa and the United Nations

21. African countries support the United Nations from which they hope to gain political and economic advantages. The United Nations provides Africans with an ideal forum. Although African members of the United Nations are not a cohesive voting bloc, except on colonial and related issues, they displayed somewhat greater agreement at the 17th General Assembly than at previous Sessions.

22. The Committee of Twenty-Four (formerly the Committee of Seventeen) has become the Assembly's major instrument for dealing with colonialism. The Committee has inter alia:
(1) recommended that the United Kingdom set aside the 1961 Southern Rhodesian constitution and call a new constitutional conference with full representation from African political parties;
(2) urged that the United Nations apply sanctions against Portugal, including an arms embargo, if Portugal continued to ignore previous United Nations resolutions calling for self-determination and independence for its territories; and (3) reaffirmed the right of the peoples of South West Africa and the United Kingdom High Commission Territories to self-determination and independence.

23. The 17th General Assembly, in addition to adopting resolutions containing all of the principal recommendations made by the Committee, recommended a broad range of diplomatic, economic and commercial sanctions against South Africa and

called upon the Security Council to take any necessary action including sanctions to bring an end to apartheid.

24. The resolutions recommending sanctions against South Africa and Portugal⁽¹⁾ (which were opposed by most NATO Members) were in direct contrast to those of the 16th General Assembly. At that session, resolutions on South Africa and Portugal avoided reference to sanctions and were worded in such a way as to obtain the support of most NATO United Nations members. Amongst the reasons for this difference is the increasing impatience of the 32 African members.

25. Nonetheless, in recent weeks, the Committee has assumed a somewhat more moderate approach, particularly on the question of Portuguese Africa⁽²⁾. Some members of this Committee have indicated a desire to revive the idea of a United Nations "rapporteur" to visit the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique. Lisbon, in turn, has indicated possible willingness to co-operate with a reasonable plan.⁽³⁾ It is expected that Southern Rhodesia will be placed on the Agenda of the Special General Assembly Session to be held in May.

26. With Katanga's secession presumably at an end, the United Nations is planning a major cut-back in UNOC military forces and, in view of its serious financial position, the organization might be forced to a gradual reduction of its civilian activities. Most experts believe that if the United Nations reduces its forces in the Congo below a level desirable for security purposes before adequate reorganization of the National Congolese Army (ANC), a dangerous situation might arise.

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- (1) General Assembly Resolution of 18th December 1963:
57 votes in favour
14 votes against
18 abstentions (including Senegal)
 - (2) For the Portuguese press release in respect to the attitude of the Portuguese government concerning the Committee of 24, see Annex II.
 - (3) A United Nations resolution to this effect was withdrawn during the final days of the 17th Session, following a decision by the Afro-Asian group to vote against the resolution unless it were substantially amended. Portugal, however, had agreed to co-operate in implementing the resolution if it were adopted without amendments. A number of African and Asian delegations privately expressed their disappointment at the Assembly's failure to adopt the measure.

Africa and the West

(i) Africa and the EEC

27. On gaining their independence, the African countries which maintained special relations with the Six confirmed the importance they attached to their association with the Common Market and urged its continuance.

28. Last year, negotiations were opened to determine the new conditions of association.

29. An agreement to this end was initialled on 20th December last and will be signed at the earliest possible moment.

30. During the negotiations between the United Kingdom and the EEC, agreement was reached to make an offer on the possible future association of African countries of the Commonwealth with the EEC, but it was refused by all interested parties(1), except Sierra Leone and the Rhodesias. This would have levelled off differences in treatment between the Associated states and Commonwealth countries and territories accepting association.

31. Since then, further discussions among the Six have led to an agreement on the ways open to states which have an economic structure and production comparable to those of associated countries to enter into relationship with the EEC.

32. Several African countries of the Commonwealth have recently shown themselves interested in entering into special arrangements with the EEC(2).

(ii) Africa and International crises

33. The US-USSR confrontation over Cuba clearly had a sobering effect on many African delegations at the United Nations, who witnessed Soviet duplicity at first hand. It is difficult to estimate how much positive African support the West would have received had resolutions on the Cuban crisis been considered in the Assembly or had Soviet aircraft carrying military equipment actually requested overflight or landing rights in Africa. However, a goodly number of African states indicated that they would not permit Soviet overflights.

(1) The Netherlands Delegation is of the opinion that the words "refused by all interested parties" form a too positive statement of the position at that time.

(2) The French expert cannot associate himself with this account as he himself has no evidence of this interest.

34. The Chinese attack on India, by showing Africans that neutrality does not, of itself, afford protection against external threats, and that they, too, cannot consider themselves safe from Communist aggression, had led them to make a reappraisal of Communist policy to the benefit of Western interests.

Countries and Territories of particular interest

(i) Congo

35. The re-integration of Katanga in the Congo Republic has removed one of the obstacles to normalisation of the situation in the Republic. However, this event in itself has not overcome all the problems which beset the Congo, and the West must still make a special effort to secure the political and economic stability of the Republic.

36. This stability will only be achieved if the Central Government is given the means of maintaining law and order throughout the length and breadth of the Republic so that bodies may be set up to inject new life into the Congolese economy.

37. With a view to giving the Central Government the means to maintain law and order, certain Western powers as well as countries of the Afro-Asian group are thinking of taking part in the reorganization of the Congolese national army in conjunction with the United Nations.

38. Furthermore, some Western powers might be called upon to collaborate with the Republic of the Congo in setting up an effective administrative and supervisory body to co-ordinate technical, financial and personnel assistance. With the Western powers would be associated certain international organizations, such as the United Nations and the Common Market.

(ii) The Togo Problem

39. The military coup d'état which cost President Olympio his life has created a domestic and an inter-African problem.

40. Under the presidency of Mr. Grunitzky, a provisional government has been formed with members of all the Togolese political parties. This government's aim is to bring about reconciliation and national unity by a policy of appeasement pending the emergence of a constituent assembly from the free elections which are to be held on 5th May. The future president is to be chosen by referendum.

41. At the inter-African level, the most difficult question is the attitude to be observed towards the provisional Togolese government. The States of the Monrovia Group, meeting in Lagos on 29th January to define their position in this matter, adopted resolutions condemning the assassination of President Olympio, and

decided to submit a draft mutual security treaty to the next Conference of Heads of State of the Monrovia Group. This move which, moreover, is in line with the concern felt in Guinea and Mali, reflects the almost general determination to prevent further armed revolts inspired by the Togolese precedent, particularly as certain disturbing signs were appearing in a number of States in the area. Furthermore, the States of the African and Malagasy Union, meeting in March at Ouagadougou decided, without committing themselves with regard to the recognition of the provisional government, to leave it to the President of Dahomey to keep the situation in Togo under review.

42. So far, only two African states, Ghana and Senegal, have granted Mr. Grunitzky's government "de jure" recognition.

(iii) Ghana

43. Ghana has become increasingly isolated from the other African states during the past year. Its relations even with fellow members of the Casablanca Group have been strained. Other countries, in particular Nigeria, have been offended by Nkrumah's encouragement of subversive activities against their governments. Although Ghana appears not to have been involved in the assassination of President Olympio, other African states have warned Ghana against taking advantage of the situation in Togo. Even at the United Nations, where the Ghanaian Delegation strives to play an active and aggressive rôle in anti-colonial matters, Ghana has lost some of its former position of leadership. Nkrumah continues to maintain close ties with the Soviet Union and with Communist China, whose position he favoured in the Sino-Indian dispute, though recent disappointments have led Ghana lately to a more balanced attitude towards the West.

44. Internally, Nkrumah has strengthened his personal control at the expense of his popularity with the people. A number of his former chief lieutenants have been arrested; the powers of the party and of the trade unions have been reduced and Nkrumah has come to rely more on his senior civil servants and on a few close personal advisers. Despite its political turmoil, Ghana remains a relatively well organized and well administered country with reasonable hopes for continued economic progress.

(iv) The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

45. Since last December, there has been a radical change in the situation in the Federation which will have far-reaching consequences in that area. In Southern Rhodesia, the government of Sir Edgar Whitehead, which had been advocating a policy of gradual concessions to the African majority, was defeated by the Rhodesian Front led by Mr. Winston Field and favouring the firm retention of white control. On 19th December, 1962, the British Government announced that Nyasaland had been granted the right to

secede from the Federation. In February 1963 Nyasaland obtained full internal self-government, the final step before independence, with the appointment of Dr. Banda as Prime Minister.

46. Talks in London led to the announcement by the British Government on 1st April that any territory which so wished (i.e. Northern Rhodesia) would be allowed to secede and that further discussions will be held in Africa on the transitional arrangements and to work out the terms of a new relationship between the territories. The situation has been complicated by the demand made by Mr. Winston Field that Southern Rhodesia be granted independence in the near future under its present constitution.

47. Although Mr. Field has belittled the possibility of serious internal disorder in Southern Rhodesia, this cannot lightly be dismissed. Frustration on the part of Southern Rhodesian Africans would seem bound to increase as the political ambitions of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesian Africans move towards complete fulfilment.

(v) The Somali Question

48. The decision of the Somali Government to break off relations with the United Kingdom, following the creation in Kenya of a new North-Frontier region, has provoked a potentially dangerous situation in East Africa.

49. The territorial claims of Somalia are inspired by a strong "Greater Somalia" nationalism. These aspirations may be difficult to contain and will continue to exist even if they find little or no support on the part of the great majority of other African states since they are based on ethnic, religious, cultural and economic factors.

50. Somalia's claims on the Northern Frontier area have caused a further deterioration in Somali-Ethiopian relations. From the point of view of Western interests, this may give rise to dangerous instability in the Horn of Africa and strengthen those anti-Western and xenophobic tendencies which are already apparent in certain sections of the population.

51. Consequently, both the USSR and Communist China have shown an increasing interest in Somalia. The Soviet Bloc is making efforts to speed up the implementation of a number of projects already programmed for the economic development of Somalia. More than one hundred Soviet experts are reported to have arrived in Somalia since last December and Moscow is pressing for an air agreement.

(vi) Algeria

52. Since independence, Algeria has chosen the course of non-alignment in its foreign policy.

53. The Algiers Government has adopted a definitely "anti-colonialist" attitude and is giving material aid to the subversive Angola MPLA and the UPA movements.

54. While remaining a member of the Casablanca Group, Algeria seems rather to give priority to problems specifically affecting North Africa over and above those of the Arab world.

55. In its domestic policy, the Algerian Government is having to grapple with a serious economic situation, which it believes it can correct by resorting to a system of state-planning on socialist lines.

(vii) Angola

56. Since the last meeting there has been some improvement in the general situation in Angola. Rebel activities are confined to sporadic attacks against the armed forces, in a more limited area than previously, and can be contained by local action. Implementation of the important reforms introduced in the economic and political fields has also helped to normalise the internal situation. Nevertheless, African states have thus far been unwilling to accept an impartial investigation of the situation in Angola without imposing conditions unacceptable to the Portuguese Government and they are likely to increase their pressure against Portugal to obtain the latter's compliance with United Nations resolutions. Subversive movements like the MPLA and the UPA may well increase their activities as a result of the material aid given them by Algeria, Ghana and countries of the Soviet Bloc and the facilities provided by the Congolese Government in the Republic of the Congo, including Katanga.

(viii) Mozambique

57. The economic situation has shown a marked improvement and calm continues to prevail throughout Mozambique. However, thanks to the material aid provided by African countries such as Algeria, Ghana and especially Tanganyika, subversive movements based in the latter will undoubtedly try to create unrest in the border areas.

(ix) South Africa

58. Tensions have increased markedly in South Africa. The African terrorist organization, POQO, has begun a campaign of racial violence which could lead to even harsher repressive countermeasures by the South African Government. At the same time, South Africa is pressing ahead with its plan for limited African self-government in the Transkei in the face of opposition from some indigenous tribal leaders, the "white" opposition parties, and the African nationalist organizations. Strict adherence to United Nations-approved anti-South African measures, e.g. sanctions, will be more vigorously called for by African states.

PART IIICOMMUNIST PENETRATIONIndigenous Communist Movements

59. The principal recent development affecting African Communist Parties was the proscription of the Communist Party and its publications in Algeria (November 1962) and Tunisia (January 1963).

60. In South Africa the Congress of Democrats, a Communist front, and the weekly New Age, a Communist publication, were banned shortly before the end of 1962. Last February South African security police raided and shut down the newspaper Spark, which had succeeded New Age in December 1962.

61. Communist-line publications are condemning the Pan-Africanist Congress as bourgeois, anti-Communist, and racist and point to "Spear of the Nation", the militant arm of the African National Congress (ANC), as the vanguard in the struggle. They support sabotage and cadre training for guerrilla warfare by "Spear of the Nation", and direct readers to Soviet, Chinese, and Cuban works on guerrilla warfare in the hope of spreading revolutionary violence in South Africa. Although there is Communist penetration of the ANC, it is not a Communist organization.

62. Basutoland has increasingly been used by the South African Communist Party, which this January in London published a new programme emphasising violent action against the South African Government.

Communist Activity in Africa(i) General

63. During the period under review, Soviet efforts at penetration of Africa have not scored any important successes largely because of the strong feelings of independence and Pan-Africanism prevailing in the newly emerging African states. Even in the so-called "African socialist states" ruling circles were inspired by local conditions rather than Marxist principles. Consequently, Soviet long-term planning seems to concentrate not on the formation of Communist Parties in Africa, but on infiltration of existing political parties, Trade Unions and Youth Organizations.

64. Soviet caution in Africa is probably due to their fear that open intervention on their part may provoke strong reactions. Events in the Congo have shown the Russians that they should not act too precipitately. However, this policy does not mean that the Soviet Union intends to remain a mere observer of political developments in Africa.

(ii) Communist Front Organizations
Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference (AAPSC)

65. The Third Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference (February, 1963, in Moshi, Tanganyika) was meant to test the cohesiveness and strength of the "Afro-Asian Peoples' Front" in Africa and to set the main lines of its action within the framework of the "struggle against imperialism and colonialism".

66. However, the Moshi Conference was dominated by the Sino-Indian conflict over the frontiers of Tibet and by the Soviet-Chinese ideological crisis, and this clearly brought home to moderate Africans that they were merely the tools of Communist propaganda, for it proved impossible to make any serious headway with the problems of Africa which are of most concern to them.

67. The preponderant influence which the Chinese People's Republic seems to exert over the administrative and executive organs of the AAPSC could, moreover, lead to a loss of members in future. Nevertheless, the Chinese, by their aggressive attitude and drive at Moshi, managed to win the sympathy of many African nationalist movements to which they promised full assistance. In contrast, the Soviet Delegation, which concentrated on extolling peaceful coexistence, was forced to give ground and adopt a defensive attitude in the face of the Chinese accusations of "white racialism".

68. The resolutions adopted at Moshi mainly highlighted the need to exploit the new concept of neo-colonialism, to step up action against the United States and the British Commonwealth, to denounce Israel as an "instrument of imperialism" and to provide active and effective assistance for African liberation movements.

69. The AAPSC, weighed down by its enormous size (255 delegates at Moshi), weakened by internal divisions and compromised in the eyes of many Africans by the Communist influence to which it is subject, is to all intents and purposes reduced to disseminating propaganda and fomenting unrest. It could run into increasing difficulties in Africa as new territories become independent.

(iii) Cultural Activities
The First International Congress of Africanists

70. Culturally, one of the most important events of recent months has been the meeting - in Accra in December last - of the First International Congress of Africanists which was attended by many African delegations as well as representatives of the USSR, the Chinese People's Republic, European countries and several Western countries.

71. Despite the general technical quality of the work, little was to be expected, from the scientific standpoint, of the Congress, the main value of which was to foster contacts.

72. Politically, the efforts of the USSR and the Chinese People's Republic to introduce cold war themes into the discussion met with failure, owing to the determination of the majority of African delegations to keep the meeting technical. Africans showed themselves alive to their responsibilities and prepared to co-operate freely with foreign countries. The definition given of the character of the Congress was that it should be international and embrace all branches of knowledge.

73. It was decided that plenary sessions would be held every three years in different cities (the USSR had suggested that the permanent headquarters should be in Accra) and administrative organs were set up. The 1965 session will be held in Dakar.

(iv) Installation of diplomatic missions

74. Soviet-bloc States have continued to develop their network of diplomatic missions in African states. A detailed list of these missions will be found at Annex III.

(v) Military aid

75. Soviet arms deliveries to the newly independent African states do not seem to have increased during the period under review. In general, Africans appear to favour economic assistance they can put to immediate use rather than purely military aid.

76. The quantities of arms which continue to be delivered by the Soviets to subversive movements active in Southern Africa are difficult to determine.

77. It is, however, interesting to note that fifty or so future Algerian Air Force officers were recently sent to the Soviet Union for training at Russian Air Force schools.

78. An approximate list of the war material delivered by the Soviet Bloc to African states and to the subversive movements in certain territories in Africa is given at Annex IV to this report.

(vi) Trade and Technical Assistance

79. Trade between the Soviet Bloc and the newly independent African states still does not amount to very much, although it has increased slightly. The Soviets are trying to create trade links of every kind with African states but they have not managed to acquire stable economic positions in these countries and to establish with them firm patterns of trade. Trade between the Western powers and Africa has not been affected by Soviet efforts and continues to expand.

80. Technical assistance from the Eastern Bloc to African states continues to be ineffective. Only a very small proportion of the credits granted by the Bloc has really been taken up.

81. It is worth noting that the work carried out by the Soviets in Africa has not always given satisfaction from the standpoint of quality and delivery dates. The professional competence and the behaviour of the technicians put at the disposal of Africans and defects in equipment and consumer goods made in Russia seem to have caused some disappointment among the recipients of such aid.

(vii) Propaganda

82. Sino-Soviet news services to Africa increased from 18 to 30 in 1962. Their broadcasting hours to Africa (excluding Arabic services) increased by 95 to a total of 295 hours weekly. There are four Communist periodicals geared to African readership currently circulating in Africa. Communist countries have also been active in making cultural gifts and in establishing libraries specialising in Bloc publications. In all these activities the Chinese have played an increasing part. Anti-Western Communist propaganda themes have undergone little change.

(viii) Civil Air Activities

83. The Bloc has achieved appreciable success in its civil aviation activities during the past year. In so doing, it is (1) increasing its ability to mount major airlifts to critical African areas, (2) improving its capability to collaborate with indigenous African airlines, and (3) acquiring a means of generating more passenger traffic between Africa and the USSR.

84. At present Soviet Aeroflot has two regular weekly routes, one to Khartoum via Cairo and the other to Accra via Belgrade, Rabat, and Conakry (see Map at Annex V). Czechoslovak Airlines (CSA) flies weekly to Conakry via Marseille, Rabat, and Dakar and to Bamako via Zurich, Rabat, and Dakar.

85. The Soviet Bloc has recently been attempting to expand and link these air routes. An agreement on 1st February gave CSA the right to fly through Tunis on a route extending from Moscow via Warsaw and Prague to Accra and Lagos. The possibility of CSA expansion into Ghana and Nigeria is indicated by the Czechoslovak air agreement with Ghana in 1961 and the Nigerian grant last summer of a provisional licence to CSA for flights to Lagos via Tunis and Accra. Mid-March talks in Prague by a Sudanese delegation on an air transport agreement indicate a probable Czechoslovak intent to begin 1963 service to Sudan and possibly beyond.

86. Formal Soviet requests to Ethiopia and the Somali Republic in late 1962 for overflight and landing privileges constitute an attempt to establish more of a projected route from Khartoum into eastern Africa. And Soviet efforts to obtain a transverse route across the continent were revealed by reports in February of requests to Chad and Nigeria for rights of overflight by twice-weekly flights from Moscow to Accra via Cairo and Khartoum.

87. An additional air link between West Africa and the USSR was established in February, when Air Ghana began a twice monthly service to Moscow via Tunis and Zurich. IL-18 aircraft and Soviet crews are used on the flight.

88. Algeria and Tunisia may sign civil aviation agreements with Bulgaria in March.

(ix) The African Students Affair in Bulgaria

89. The exodus of seventy-eight African students from Sofia constitutes an asset for the West. The following accusations against the Bulgarians were brought to the notice of African governments by their respective students:

- (a) ban on the establishment of an All-African students' union in Bulgaria;
- (b) Communist indoctrination;
- (c) hostility and racial prejudice;
- (d) agitation against their own governments and against the West;
- (e) low standard of education and of living.

Yugoslavia

90. During the last six months, Yugoslav activity in Africa, while still intensive, has not made any appreciable headway.

91. The policy of giving economic aid to African states, hampered by the Yugoslav Government's policy of cutting down on expenditure in all spheres, is more than every dependent on the assistance which Belgrade receives from Western countries and Moscow.

92. For all this, Yugoslavia is making a considerable and determined effort in Africa. Generally speaking, the Belgrade Government has succeeded in consolidating its political prestige and promoting its economic interests even though Yugoslav trade with African states is still very limited.

93. At the present time there are fourteen Yugoslav diplomatic missions in Africa (Algeria, Congo (Leopoldville), Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Libia, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, United Arab Republic, Senegal, Sudan, Tanganyika, Tunisia).

MEMBERSHIP OF AFRICAN GROUPINGS

Casablanca Group:

Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, UAR.

The African and Malagasy Union (UAM):

Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville),
Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mauritania,
Niger, Ruanda, Senegal, Tchad, Upper Volta.

Monrovia Group: Inter-African and Malagasy States Organization
(IAMS0):

Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville)
Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ivory Coast,
Liberia, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra-Leone,
Tchad, Togo, Upper Volta.

Pan-African Freedom Movement for East, Central and Southern
Africa (PAFMECSA):

Representatives from six independent states:

Burundi, Congo (Leopoldville), Ethiopia, Ruanda,
Tanganyika, Uganda.

Representatives of nine nationalist movements:

Basutoland, Bechuanaland, Kenya, Mozambique, Northern
Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, South-west Africa, Swaziland
and Zanzibar (with an observer from Angola).

PRESS NOTE ISSUED BY THE PORTUGUESE MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON 8th MARCH, 1962

The statement has been made in press circles that the Portuguese Delegation to the United Nations has "boycotted the debate" of the Special Committee of 24, now in session, while it has also been reported that the said Committee sent an invitation to Portugal to participate in its work.

As regards the first point, it may not be alleged that Portugal has "boycotted" a body whose members are designated only by election and for which Portugal was not elected nor indeed sought to be elected. Thus there is no reason why Portugal should be present in that body.

As regards the second point, it can be confirmed that an invitation was in fact sent and received. However, since Portugal is not a member of the Committee, no legal ground can be found for the invitation, except that resulting from a deliberation of the Committee itself. In these circumstances, Portugal's participation with a different status, inferior to that of the other members of the Committee, could only be understood as a matter of favour, which is declined with thanks, or as an accused to whom a chance is given to defend himself, which is rejected.

It is also recalled that the Portuguese Government never recognised the legality of the Committee in question and that, on the other hand, it sees no advantage for Portugal in debates which are known to be conducted by and subordinated to a unilateral judgment and whose conclusions are known in advance. Even so one cannot but feel surprised at an invitation seeking to obtain the co-operation of Portugal now, since that co-operation was repelled during the last General Assembly when the proposal to appoint "international rapporteurs", which the Portuguese Government had then accepted, was rejected.

DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIONS OF THE SOVIET BLOC
(excluding Yugoslavia) in Africa

Algeria:	Soviet Union, Poland, CSR, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Red China
Ethiopia:	Soviet Union, Poland, CSR, Hungary, Romania, Albania
Burundi:	Soviet Union, Poland,
Congo (Leopoldville):	Soviet Union, Poland, CSR, Bulgaria, Red China
Dahomey:	Hungary
Ghana:	Soviet Union, Poland, CSR, Hungary, Bulgaria, Red China
Guinea:	Soviet Union, Poland, CSR, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Red China, North Korea, North Viet-Nam, Mongolian People's Republic
Libya:	Soviet Union, CSR, Albania
Mali:	Soviet Union, Poland, CSR, Hungary, Bulgaria, Red China, North Korea, North Viet-Nam, Mongolian People's Republic
Morocco:	Soviet Union, Poland, CSR, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Red China, North Viet-Nam
Nigeria:	Soviet Union, CSR
Senegal:	Soviet Union
Sierra Leone:	Soviet Union, CSR, Bulgaria
Somalia:	Soviet Union, Poland, CSR, Bulgaria, Albania, Red China
Sudan:	Soviet Union, Poland, CSR, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Red China
Tanganyika:	Soviet Union, Poland, CSR, Red China
Togo:	Soviet Union, CSR
Tunisia:	Soviet Union, Poland, CSR, Bulgaria
Uganda:	Red China
Central African Republic:	Soviet Union

The Soviet-occupied zone of Germany has trade representations in the following African countries: Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, the Sudan,

WEAPONS SUPPLIED BY THE SOVIET BLOC TO
 THE AFRICAN STATES

Algeria:

A. Up to the peace treaty with France:

7,000 tons of light weapons and ammunition as well as a small number of armoured vehicles and heavy weapons from the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany, Bulgaria, Poland, China, USSR and Yugoslavia.

B. Since Algeria acquired independence:

USSR: 100 mortars
 50 cannon
 3 mine-clearing tanks
 10 fighter aircraft (MIG)
 6 transporters
 9 helicopters
 2 fast patrol boats

CSR: equipment for 2 infantry divisions.

Angola: (illegal)

USSR: 10,000 cases of small arms and ammunition
 200 flame throwers

Bulgaria: 500 pistols

China: mortars

Mozambique: (illegal)

Eastern bloc: an unknown quantity of small arms and ammunition

Portuguese Guinea: (illegal)

USSR: an unknown quantity of small arms and ammunition

Guinea:

USSR and CSR: equipment for 2 infantry divisions
 200 flame throwers
 8 amphibious vehicles
 20 medium tanks
 6 fighter aircraft (MIG)
 10 helicopters
 4 patrol boats

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Ghana:

USSR: 700 cases of weapons
CSR: an unknown number of tanks and guns
Yugoslavia: an unknown number of small arms, guns
and fast patrol boats

Congo (Leopoldville):

Eastern bloc: small arms
armoured vehicles
an unknown number of truck-mounted
anti-aircraft weapons

Cameroun: (illegal)

China: small arms for 3,000 rebels

Mali:

USSR: 31,000 machine guns and rifles with ammunition
48 armoured reconnaissance cars and
infantry armoured fighting vehicles
CSR: 2,000 machine guns

Morocco:

USSR: weapons for 1 artillery regiment
110 tanks
250 cannon
120 fighter aircraft (MIG)
4 training vehicles
2 bombers
10 transporters
CSR: 150 tons of small arms, mortars and guns
equipment for 1 armoured division
12,000 cases of ammunition
330 tons of automatic weapons

Eastern bloc: 15,000 cases of ammunition

Mauritania:

(via Morocco) an unknown quantity of small arms

Somalia:

USSR: small arms
20 tracked vehicles
10 anti-aircraft machine guns
CSR: 2 training aircraft

The Sudan:

USSR: 40 infantry armoured fighting vehicles
CSR: an unknown quantity of small arms
Yugoslavia: 4 patrol boats

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DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE


SOVIET BLOC CIVIL AIR ROUTES IN AFRICA

ITINERAIRES AFRICAINS DES COMPAGNIES AERIENNES DU BLOC SOVIETIQUE

March 1, 1963 - Au 1er mars 1963

All routes shown are schematic

Tous les itinéraires sont indiqués schématiquement



(1) Conventions et droits en vigueur

L'URSS a conclu des conventions aériennes avec le Maroc, la RAU, la Guinée, le Mali, le Ghana et le Soudan.

La Tchécoslovaquie a conclu des conventions aériennes avec la RAU, la Tunisie, le Maroc, le Sénégal, le Mali, la Guinée et le Ghana. La CSA est autorisée à pénétrer au Nigéria. En sa qualité de membre de l'OACI et de signataire de son Accord sur les services de transit aérien, la CSA peut survoler le territoire des co-signataires de cet accord ou y procéder à des escales techniques.

Négociations en cours

L'URSS a demandé au Tchad et au Nigéria de lui accorder des droits de survol. Elle aurait pressenti la Tunisie à cet effet.

La Tchécoslovaquie négocie avec le Soudan et aurait également pressenti l'Algérie.